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ARTICLES
The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative
Issues in Black and White
Dorothy A. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have debated the marriage penalty/bonus
question.' Those scholars have proposed solutions ranging from
individual filing requirements to increased child care deductions.
2
However, all proposed solutions have a limited impact because they
are built upon a model in which all women are assumed to be the
same. If a solution to the marriage penalty/bonus issue is to help
women in today's society, their differences must be explored.
For the most part, the literature treats all women as marginal
wage earners who are discouraged from working in the paid labor
market. Thus, solutions are designed to encourage women to work in
the paid labor market. However, these solutions do not address the
problem of the many women who are already working full-time in the
paid labor market.
Part I of this article begins by briefly describing the marriage
penalty/bonus issue. It then provides Census Bureau data that shows
that African-American households are more likely to pay a marriage
penalty and White households are more likely to receive a marriage
bonus. Part II then describes proposed legislative solutions to the
marriage penalty/bonus issue. Part II analyzes the proposed
Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D. 1983,
Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M. 1984, New York University.
I See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax
Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469, 1471 n.2 (1997) (citing
various articles that discuss the marriage penalty/bonus issue).
2 /d. at 1484-88 (describing the literature's proposed solutions).
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legislative solutions based on the differences in African-American and
White households. This article concludes by noting that any solution
to the marriage penalty/bonus issue must take into account the racial
and class distinction among women.
I. THE MARRIAGE PENALTY/BONUS DILEMMA
A. Introduction
Simply put, the marriage penalty occurs whenever a married
couple pays higher federal income taxes as a result of being married
than they would have paid had they remained single. The marriage
bonus occurs whenever a married couple pays less in federal income
taxes as a result of being married than they would have paid had they
remained single. The marriage penalty/bonus issue is largely a result
of the different tax brackets used by single taxpayers and married
taxpayers.3
The marriage penalty is the highest when household income is
contributed roughly equally by each spouse.4 Taxpayers earning
roughly equal amounts are penalized and pay a marriage penalty
because the married tax brackets are not double the single tax
brackets. 5 The marriage bonus is the highest when household income
See James E. Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and the
Carriage, 67 TAx NoTEs TODAY 539, 544-46 (1995) (explaining phase-outs and other
limitations that cause the marriage penalty). Although married taxpayers can also file
separately, there is generally not a tax advantage in doing so. See Brown, supra note I, at
1473 n.10.
4 See Brown, supra note I, at 1479 (indicating that as a percentage of
income, the marriage penalty associated with the earned income tax credit can be quite
high due to the earned income tax credit's phase-out provisions being identical for
married and single individuals).5 Section I of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code states:
(a) Married Individuals Filing Joint Returns and Surviving Spouses - There
is hereby imposed on the taxable income of-
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is contributed by only one spouse.6 Because the married tax brackets
allow for more income at each tax bracket given that the household is
composed of two instead of one, the marginal tax rate will be lower
given the same total household income.
B. Examples
Let's consider a couple of examples.
(I) every married individual (as defined in section 143) who makes a single
return jointly with his spouse under section 6013, and
(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)),
a tax determined in accordance with the following tables:
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $36,900 15% of taxable income.
Over $36,900 but not over $89,150 $5,535, plus 28% of the
excess over $36,900.
Over $39,150 but not over 140,000 $20,165, plus 31% of the
excess over $89,150.
Over $140,000 but not over $250,000 $35,928.50 plus 36% of the
excess over $140,000.
Over $250,000 $75,528.50 plus 39.6% of the
excess over $250,000.
(c) Unmarried Individuals (Other Than Surviving Spouses and Heads of
Households).--There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual (other
than a surviving spouse as defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in
section 2(b)) who is not a married individual (as defined in section 7703) a tax determined
in accordance with the following table:
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $22,100 15% of taxable income.
Over $22,100 but not over $53,500 $3,315, plus 28% of the
excess over $22, 100.
Over $53,500 but not over $115,000 $12,107, plus 31% of the
excess over $53,500.
Over 115,500 but not over $250,000 $31,172, plus 36% of the
excess over $115,000.
Over $250,000 $79,772, plus 39.6% of the
excess over $250,000.
6 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1479.
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Example #1: John and Sally Johnson are married taxpayers
with taxable income of $100,000. Their tax liability under § l(a) is
$23,528.50. 7 Before they were married they each had taxable income
of $50,000, and their individual tax liability under § 1(c) is $11,127 8
for a total liability of $22,254. As a result of marriage, John and Sally
would have a higher federal income tax liability than if they remained
single. They pay a marriage penalty.
Example #2: Peter and Cathy are married taxpayers with
taxable income of $100,000. Their tax liability under § l(a) is
$23,528.50. Before they were married, Cathy had taxable income of
$100,000 and Peter had no taxable income. Cathy's tax liability under
§ 1(c) is $26,522. 9 As a result of marriage Cathy and Peter have a
lower federal income tax liability than if they had remained single.
They receive a marriage bonus.
C. Marriage Penalty/Bonus Calculations
Reprinted below is Table 1, which describes the marriage
penalty/bonus resulting from the joint return.10
7 Taxable income after deductions is $100,000. The tax is calculated as
follows:
$20,165 +.31($100,000 - $89,150)=
$20,165 +.31 ($10,850) =
$20,165 + $3,363.5 =
$23,528.50 total tax liability.
8 Tax computations under § I(c) are as follows:
$3,315 + .28 ($50,000 - $22,100) =
$3,315 + .28 ($27,900) =
$3,315 + $7812 = $11,127.
9 The tax computation under § I(c) are as follows:
$12,107 + .31 ($100,000 - $53,500) =
$12,107 + .31 ($46,500) =
$12,107 + $14,415 = $26,522.
10 See John Brozovsky & A. J.. Cataldo II, The Marriage Tax Penalty:
Inequities and Tax Planning Opportunities, OHIO CPA J., Dec. 1993, at 21-22 (table
reprinted with permission of publisher). This chart describes the marriage bonus (or
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Table 1.1
THE MARRIAGE TAX (PENALTY)/BONUS BY INCOME
& ALLOCATION BETWEEN SPOUSES/SINGLES (1993).
INCOME ALLOCATION
INCOME 0%/100% 10%/90% 20%/80% 30%/70% 40%/60% 50%/50%
$20,000 728 428 128 (173) (180) (180)
$30,000 968 278 (173) (180) (180) (180)
$40,000 2,268 1,148 321 (180) (180) (180)
$50,000 3,282 1,882. 1,075 425 (226) (466)
$60,000 3,296 1,602 815 35 (746) (1,285)
$70,000 3,596 1,568 555 (356) (1,266) (1,285)
$80,000 3,896 1,708 428 (746) (1,285) (1,285)
$90,000 4,196 1,848 408 (1,032) (1,285) (1,285)
$100,000 4,497 1,990 390 (970) (1,270) (1,284)
$125,000 4,695 1,590 (411) (1,195) (1,570) (1,857)
$150,000 5,945 1,887 (970) (1,420) (1,857) (1,859)
$200,000 5,990 882 (84) (3,364) (4,312) (4,312)
$500,000 6,164 (4,203) (8,789) (11,642) (13,442) (15,024)
What the table does not disclose is the full extent of the race,
class, and gender implications of the marriage penalty/bonus which
has been the subject of my prior research." Although the table
suggests that households with $500,000 contributed equally by
penalty) paid by married couples when compared with what they would have paid had
they remained single. For example, a sole wage earner household (0%//100%) earning
$20,000 of income would receive a marriage bonus of $728.00. The chart ignores the
Earned Income Tax Credit's marriage penalty or marriage bonus.
See generally Brown, supra note i; see also Dorothy A. Brown, The
Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45, 45-57 (Karen B.
Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
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spouses would result in a $15,024 marriage penalty, the table does not
tell us the likelihood of such a household existing. The data discussed
herein suggests that such couples are rare indeed. Further, the Internal
Revenue Service does not compile any data by race.12 As a result,
Census Bureau data will be used as a proxy.
D. Marriage Penalty/Bonus Calculations in Black and White
1. Household Contributions of African-American Spouses
The marriage penalty/bonus is a function of the percentage of
total taxable household income that is contributed by husbands and*
wives. The penalty is the greatest where husbands and wives
contribute equal amounts and the marriage bonus is the greatest where
only one spouse-works in the paid labor market and contributes all of
the total taxable household income. A 1990 study by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found that married African-American
women contribute higher percentages to household income than
married White women.1 3 My research, which is based upon Census
Bureau data and supports that finding, is reproduced below.
14
12 See Dorothy A. Brown, Split Personalities: Tax Law and Critical Race
Theory, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 89, 91 (1997).
13 See U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RTS., THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN:
AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION, 99 (1990) (hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS).
14 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1492 (reprinted with permission of publisher).
The information in Tables 3.1-3.6 is from 1990 Public Use Micro-Data Sample and is
based upon a 5% sample of the population of same race couples (on file with author).
The information is collected by the Census Bureau; however, it is not published. Census
Bureau data is used herein because the Internal Revenue Service does not keep data based
upon race.
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Table 1.2
HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTION BY
AFRICAN-AMERICAN WIVES
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
to to to to to to to to to to
Household
Income 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
$0 to
10,000 42.27 1.40 1.60 1.57 1.83 2.89 2.23 2.05 2.36 41.81
$10,001 to
20,000 22.31 2.19 2.53 2.88 4.45 7.63 6.22 5.41 5.30 41.09
$20,001 to
30,000 10.37 1.68 2.70 4.15 8.32 15.70 12.94 9.17 6.48 28.51
$30,001 to
40,000 5.28 1.39 2.41 4.73 11.37 21.35 15.57 10.40 6.65 20.84
$40,001 to
50,000 2.43 1.01 2.00 5.71 13.28 23.46 20.93 11.86 6.23 13.07
$50,001 to
60,000 1.06 .61 1.98 5.54 13.49 29.39 22.04 12.08 5.67 8.16
$60,001 to
70,000 .75 .34 1.87 5.96 15.28 31.21 22.42 12.12 4.41 5.64
$70,001 to
80,000 .82 .57 1.17 5.27 16.17 31.76 24.19 10.43 3.80 5.82
$80,001 to
90,000 .47 .19 1.72 4.48 16.20 33.26 21.76 12.75 3.77 5.40
$90,001 to
100,000 .65 .54 2.11 4.63 11.42 31.01 22.71 13.87 7.15 5.90
$100,001
to 120,000 1.20 1.62 2.12 5.37 8.59 27.56 23.20 16.32 5.98 8.04
$120,001
& over 5.46 2.56 2.55 3.07 4.63 17.14 9.09 11.43 12.13 31.94
For households of up to $10,000, 42.27% of African-
American wives contribute between 90 and 100% of total household
income. At the same income level, 41.81% of African-American
wives contribute up to 10% of total household income. Notice the
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significantly high percentages of African-American wives who
contribute between 40 and 60% to total household income. Those are
the highest marriage penalty categories. Also, note the significantly
low percentages of wives who contribute either between 90 and 100%
of their household income at the greater than $60,000 level as well as
the wives who contribute between 0 and 10% of their household
income. Those are the marriage bonus categories.
2. Household Contributions of White Spouses
15
Table 1.3
HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS BY
WHITE WIVES
Income Levels 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
to to to to to to to to to to
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
$0 to
10,000 43.08 1.03 1.17 1.16 1.35 2.44 1.75 1.66 1.92 44.45
$10,001 to
20,000 24.67 1.71 2.06 2.45 3.23 5.95 5.06 4.93 5.35 44.59
$20,001 to
30,000 10.31 1.30 1,96 2.75 4.90 9.47 9.40 8.46 8.44 43.00
$30,001 to
40,000 4.11 .89 1.47 2.69 5.99 13.08 12.80 11.21 10.16 37.60
$40,001 to
50,000 1.82 .57 1.17 2.69 7.11 15.13 16.48 13.05 10.76 31.23
$50,001 to
60,000 .95 .42 .90 2.64 7.85 18.50 18.42 13.82 10.41 26.09
$60,001 to
70,000 .70 .32 .83 2.57 8.35 19.54 19.09 15.53 9.60 23.47
$70,001 to
80,000 .71 .28 .61 2.43 7.97 18.93 20.63 13.43 9.60 25.39
$80,001 to
90,000 .64 .27 .64 2.17 7.85 19.19 17.95 15.21 10.17 25.91
$90,001 to
100,000 .84 .30 .80 2.05 6.35 15.61 14.95 13.89 9.77 35.45
$100,001 to
120,000 .73 .41 1.00 2.39 5.54 13.82 13.86 14.12 12.21 35.91
$120,001 & over 1.20 .76 1.35 151 2.47 :6.76 6.35 9.11 12.79 57.70
One can again
between 90 and 100%
observe 43.08% of White wives contributing
of total household income at the $10,000 and
15 See id. at 1496 (reprinted with permission of publisher).
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under category, as well as 44.45% of White wives contributing
between 0 and 10% of total household income at the $10,000 and
under category. Note the significantly high percentages of White
wives at all income levels that contribute between 0 and 10% to
household income. That is the marriage bonus category. In the
greatest marriage penalty category, namely where wives contribute
between 40 and 60% to total household income, the percentage of
White wives in those categories is much lower than those in the
marriage bonus category.
3. Marriage Bonus in Black and White
16
Table 14
GREATEST MARRIAGE BONUS BY INCOME LEVEL
Household Income WHITE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
Income Split Income Split
100/0% - 90/10% 100/0% - 90/10%
$0-10,000 87.49% 84.06%
$10,001-20,000 69.11% 63.25%
$20,001-30,000 53.21% 38.81%
$30,001-40,000 41.63% 26.07%
$40,001-50,000 32.87% 15.42%
$50,001-60,000 27.00% 9.22%
$60,001-70,000 24.15% 6.37%
$70,001-80,000 26.06% 6.59%
$80,001-90,000 26.54% 5.88%
$90,001-100,000 35.98% 6.55%
$100,001-120,000 36.61% 9.24%
$120,001 -over 58.88% 37.40%
At every income level, there are fewer percentages of African-
American couples who receive a marriage bonus than White couples.
Conversely, at every income level, there are higher percentages of
White couples who receive the marriage bonus, than do African-
American couples. In some instances, five times as many Whites
receive a marriage bonus than African-Americans.
16 See id. at 1500 (reprinted with permission of publisher).
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With respect to middle-income African-Americans, they are
least likely to receive a marriage bonus. African-Americans earning
over $120,000 are the most likely to receive a marriage bonus.
Similarly, White households earning over $120,000 are most likely to
receive a marriage bonus.
4. Marriage Penalty in Black and White'
7
Table 1.5
GREATEST MARRIAGE PENALTY BY INCOME LEVEL
Household Income WHITE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
Income Split Income Split
60%/40% - 50%150% 60%/40% - 50%150%
SO-10,000 3.97% 5.06%
$10,001-20,000 9.58% 12.65%
S20,001-30,000 15.18% 25.1 1%
$30,001-40,000 19.38% 33.16%
$40,001-50,000 23.33% 38.33%
$50,001-60,000 26.72% 43.21%
$60,001-70,000 28.17% 46.76%
S70,001-80,000 27.79% 49.23%
$80,001-90,000 27.17% 49.53%
$90.001-100,000 22.97% 44.15%
$100,001-120,000 19.48% 36.15%
$120,001-over 9.42% 21.96%
At every income level there are fewer percentages of White
couples who pay a marriage penalty than do African-American
couples. Conversely, at every income level there are higher
17 See id. at 1502 (reprinted with permission of publisher).
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percentages of African-American couples who pay a marriage penalty
than do White couples. You will note, however, that of all the White
couples, at least a quarter of those in households with between
$50,000 and $90,000 total income pay the marriage penalty. With
respect to the African-American couples, almost half of those
households earning between $60,000 and $90,000 pay the marriage
penalty.
5. Marriage Penalty/Bonus in Black
18
Table 1.6
AFRICAN-AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
A B C D E
Income Levels 100%/0% - 90%/10%- 80%/20% - 70%/30% - 60%/40% -
90%/10% 80%/20% 70%/30% 60%/40% 50%/50%
$0 to 10,000 84.06 3.60 3.70 3.57 5.06
$10,001 to 20,000 63.25 7.32 8.02 8.76 12.65
$20,001 to 30,000 38.81 7.75 12.20 16.13 25.11
$30,001 to 40,000 26.07 7.76 12.94 20.08 33.16
$40,001 to 50,000 15.42 6.87 13.70 25.68 38.33
$50,001 to 60,000 9.22 6.13 14.00 27.45 43.21
$60,001 to 70,000 6.37 4.57 14.13 28.17 46.76
$70,001 to 80,000 6.59 4.21 11.73 28.23 49.23
$80,001 to 90,000 5.88 3.81 14.62 26.17 49.53
$90,001 to 100,000 6.55 7.52 14.90 26.88 44.15
$100,001 to 120,000 9.24 7.60 18.35 28.66 36.15
$120,001 & over 37.40 14.54 14.12 11.98 21.96
As you can determine, the greatest percentages of African-
Americans are found in Column E, which is the greatest marriage
penalty for household income between $30,000 and $120,000. In the
over $120,000 household income level, the greatest percentages of
African-Americans are found in Column A, which is the greatest
18 Id. at 1504 (reprinted with permission of publisher).
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marriage bonus column. At the under $30,001 category, the greatest
percentage of African-Americans are found in Column A. Yet that
category, I believe, is skewed by the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) which has severe marriage penalties. 19 As a result, most
families eligible for the EITC are in single wage-earner households,
even though one might expect to observe two wage earners.
If you compare the percentages of African-American in the
marriage penalty in column E with the African-Americans in the
marriage bonus in column A, you can observe the significantly greater
numbers paying the marriage penalty.
6. Marriage Penalty/Bonus in White
20
Table 1.7
WHITE HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Income Levels Contribution Percentages
A B C D E
100%10%- 90%/10%- 80%/20°%/- 70%/30%- 60%/40%-
90%/10% 80%/20% 70%/30% 60%/40% 50%/50%
$0- 1 0,000 87.49% 2.85% 2.89% 2.80% 3.97%
$10,001-20,000 69.11% 6.88% 7.18% 7.26% 9.58%
$20,001-30,000 53.21% 9.27% 10.87% 11.47% 15.18%
$30,001-40,000 41.63% 10.77% 12.79% 15.43% 19.38%
$40,001-50,000 32.87% 10.86% 14,39% 18.55% 23.33%
$50,001-60,000 27.00% 10.63% 14.77% 20.88% 26.72%
$60,001-70,000 24.15% 9.80% 16.44% 21.44% 28.17%
$70,001-80,000 26.06% 9.27% 14.63% 22.25% 27.79%
$80,001-90,000 26.54% 10.27% 15.98% 20.04% 27.17%
$90,001-100,000 35,98% 9.78% 14.52% 16.74% 22.97%
$100,001-120,000 36,61% 12.57% 15.17% 16.17% 19.48%
$120,001 -over 58.88% 13.07% 10.47% 7.70% 9.42%
As you can see, there are far greater percentages of White
households in marriage bonus category A than in marriage penalty
19 See id. at 1479 (stating that "[piroportionately, however, the marriage
penalty is greatest for low-income individuals due to the operation of the earned income
tax credit"); see also Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations
of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533, 559-64 (1995).
20 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1505 (reprinted with permission of publisher).
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category E. In the $60,001 - $90,000 household incomes levels there
are more White couples paying the marriage penalty than are
receiving the marriage bonus.
7. Summary
In conclusion, African-American households are more likely
to pay a marriage penalty, and White households are more likely to
receive a marriage bonus. Middle-income White households are most
likely to pay a marriage penalty. Upper-income African-Americans
are most likely to receive a marriage bonus. Middle-income African-
Americans are least likely to receive a marriage bonus. As the data
shows, women can be placed in one of the following three categories:
(i) those that never work in the paid labor market; (ii) those that
sometimes work in the labor market; and (iii) those that always work
in the paid labor market. Those women most likely to never work or
sometimes work in the paid labor market are White and those women
most likely to always work in the paid labor market are African-
American.
II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN BLACK AND WHITE
A. Increasing the Standard Deduction
This legislative solution would increase the standard
deduction for joint returns to a level exactly twice that of an individual
return. Increasing the standard deduction would theoretically reduce
the marriage penalty, and potentially increase the marriage bonus.
The proposal would not eliminate the marriage penalty for those filing
itemized deductions, it would, however, assist those households
currently paying the marriage penalty who use the standard deduction.
The IRS keeps statistics based upon the number of married
taxpayers who file with itemized deductions and those who file with
1999] 299
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the standard deduction, although we have no racial breakdowns. In
1996, of those married and filing jointly, approximately 54 percent
filed using itemized deductions, and 46 percent filed using the
standard deduction. Accordingly, based on 1996 tax return data,. the
majority of taxpayers filing joint returns would not be greatly assisted
by this proposal. Further, we have no data as to whether it is more or
less likely that White tax payers or African-American taxpayers file
using the standard deduction or itemized deductions.
B. Adjusting the Earned Income Tax Credit
The effectiveness of this proposal will depend upon which
couples benefit from the EITC. Very little scholarly research has, been
done that examines who actually benefits from the EITC. My, data
suggests, however, that the majority of those households eligible for
the earned income tax credit are in single wage earner households.
One legislative solution would increase the EITC phaseout -
the point at which taxpayers begin to loose their credit based upon
total household income. This would decrease the marriage penalty to
which low-income taxpayers are subject. Given the similarity
between White and Black households at the lower income levels, this
proposal should help both groups.
C. Widening the Tax Brackets for Joint Tax Returns
This proposal will virtually eliminate the marriage penalty
except regarding the EITC, assuming the Internal Revenue Code's
other provisions are amended to ensure that married couples receive
the benefit of twice what a single individual would receive. This
proposal will also increase the marriage bonus for many families
already receiving the marriage bonus. As the earlier part of this article
showed, White households are disproportionately receiving the
marriage bonus. One would expect this proposal to even further
increase the number of White families receiving the marriage bonus.
This proposal, by eliminating the marriage penalty, would
[Vol. XVI300
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assist African-American dual earner couples by reducing their tax
liability. What this proposal will not do is increase the number of
African-American households receiving the marriage bonus (unless
they are already receiving the bonus). Until African-Americans earn
sufficient wages to allow for an increase in the number of African-
American single wage earner households, this proposal will do little to
increase marriage bonuses to African-American households.
21
D. Deduction/Credit for Dual Earner Couple
This proposal perpetuates the myth that all American
households fall within the primary/secondary model such that there is
one primary wage earner and one marginal, secondary wage earner.
z2
In African-American households, many spouses are co-providers.
Similarly with respect to middle income White households, White
spouses are co-providers.
This proposal, however, would not increase the number of
households receiving a marriage bonus. This proposal would most
likely have a positive impact on African-American and White families
who currently pay a marriage penalty. Yet, the $50,000 phaseout
limit on income (complete bar for households receiving $60,000)
renders ineffective the gains that might otherwise accrue to those
African-American and White families earning over $60,000.
21 Category - Married Mean Wage - 1990
White men $39,389
African-American men $27,026
White women $23,493
African-American women $20,693
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS,
FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990, CURRENT POPULATION REP., tbl. 28
Series P-60, No. 174, (1991) (Table of Marital Status - Persons 18 Years Old and Over,
by Total Money Income in 1990, Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex, and Work Experience in
1990).
22 See Brown, supra note I, at 1507 (concluding that "[t]he
primary/secondary paradigm does not fit most households").
N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM RTS.
Remember, the greatest percentage of White households paying the
marriage penalty was in the $60,000-$90,000 household income
category.
E. Allowing Individual Tax Calculations
The proposal for allowing individual tax calculations would
allow each spouse to calculate taxable income separately based upon
an allocation of income, deductions and credits attributable to each
spouse. The tax rate to be applied would be the same as that for a
single taxpayer. This proposal would eliminate the marriage penalty,
as couples would file individually if a joint return would result in a
higher tax liability. It would still permit marriage bonuses which
disproportionately benefit White households, particularly upper-
income White households.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while it is important to eliminate the marriage
penalty, it is more important for husbands and wives to make
decisions about labor force participation without the influence of
federal tax laws. What would the average American married
household look like if men and women and African-Americans and
Whites all earned the same wages? Would we see more women who
are sole wage earners? Would we see more stay-at-home dads? How
much of what we see today is merely a societal construct reinforced
by and reflected in the Internal Revenue Code? Whatever legislative
solution is adopted to solve the marriage bonus/penalty issue, it must
consider the differences in American households.
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